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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
UNITED ST ATES SMELTING 
REFINING AND MINING 
COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PAUL D. NIELSEN and the 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
OF UTAH 
Defendants. 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 
10703 
The plaintiff United States Smelting Refining and 
Mining Company claims that under the Workmen's Com-
pensation Laws of the State of Utah, there is no liability 
for payment of temporary total disability or permanent 
partial disability after the expiration of "six years from 
the date of injury". 
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DISPOSITION BY THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
The Industrial Commission of Utah denied plaintiff's 
defense and made an award to Mr. Paul D. Nielsen for 
complications arising in 1965 out of an injury which 
occurred in 1952. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks a reversal of the order of the Industrial 
Commission of Utah and a decision of this Court constru-
ing the Statute of Limitations contained in the section 
pertaining to temporary total disability and permanent 
partial disability. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In this case, Mr. Paul D. Nielsen was injured on 
September 16, 1952 while he was employed by the plain-
tiff as a miner at its Lark Mine. His left leg and left 
knee cap were broken. (Tr. 12) The plaintiff is self-
insured. On February 5, 1954, Mr. Nielsen received a 
permanent partial disability rating of 3 0% loss of use of 
the left lower extremity at the hip. (Tr. 20) The award 
was paid in a lump sum payment for the purpose of 
purchasing a tavern at Moroni, Utah. (Tr. 22) Since 
March 1, 1954, Mr. Nielsen has not worked for the Com-
pany, being self-employed at his tavern. 
In March of 1965, Dr. Robert H. Lamb advised the 
plaintiff employer that Mr. Nielsen should have arthroto-
my of the left knee and a pallectomy (removal of the left 
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kneecap). (Tr. 28) The Company admitted liability for 
the hospital and surgical expenses of the operation, but it 
reserved the right to a hearing pertaining to its legal 
obligation to pay temporary total disability benefits and 
permanent partial disability benefits in view of the fact 
that more than six years had expired since the date of 
injury. (Tr. 29) 
The operation for the removal of the kneecap was 
performed on April 12, 1965, (Tr. 38) but apparently 
during the course of the operation, the ulnar nerve in Mr. 
Nielsen's elbows became pinched causing a bi-lateral ulnar 
palsy. Mr. Nielsen complained that he had lost every bit 
of strength in his arms and hands and some loss of sensa-
tion and use of his fingers. The Medical Panel found a 
weakness and atrophy of the intrinsic hand muscles sup-
plied by the ulnar nerve which was greater on the left side. 
(Tr. 56) The Medical Panel concluded that the patient's 
bi-lateral ulnar palsy occurring acutely at the time of 
surgery is an uncommon, hut by no means unusual com-
plication of surgery. (Tr. 60) The surgical removal of 
the left kneecap was successful and no further permanent 
partial disability award was made concerning the left leg. 
The Medical Panel found a 10% permanent impairment of 
the right arm, a 12% permanent impairment of the left 
arm, and a total of 13 % impairment of the whole man. 
(Tr. 66) 
Based upon the Medical Panel Report, the Commission 
ordered the employer to pay permanent partial compensa-
tion of 12% of 200 weeks (24 weeks-amounting to 
$725.00) and temporary total disability based on the 1952 
rate, amounting to $1,011.21. (Tr. 91) 
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ARGUMENT 
THE LEGISLATURE ONLY AUTHORIZED 
PAYMENT OF TEMPORARY TOTAL COMPENSA-
TION AND PERMANENT PARTIAL COMPENSA-
TION FOR SIX YEARS FROM THE DATE OF IN-
JURY. 
Mr. Nielsen's right to compensation is governed by 
the law in force at the time of the occurrence of the 
injury. Silver King Coalition Mines Co. v. Industrial 
Commission, 2 Utah 2d, 1, 268 P2d. 689. 
Although there is no practical difference in the statu-
tory language pertaining to the six year limitations between 
1952 and 1965, plaintiff cites in its brief the provisions 
of the statute as it existed under the 1951 Amendment. 
The Table of Contents indicates the corresponding sec-
tion found in Utah Code Annotated 19 5 3. 
The pertinent portions of the statutes provide: 
"Sec. 42-1-61. Compensation - -Temporary Dis-
ability. 
In case of temporary disability, the employee 
shall receive sixty per cent of his average weekly 
wages so long as such disability is total, not to ex-
ceed a maximum of $27.50 per week and not less 
than a minimum of $17.50 per week, plus five per 
cent of the amount of such award for each depend-
ent minor child under the age of eighteen years, up 
to and including five such minor children or a 
maximum increase of twenty-five per cent in case 
of five or more such minor dependents; Provided 
that where the wage earned at the time of injury is 
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less than $17.50 per week, the amount of wages 
earned shall be the amount of compensation to be 
paid. In no case shall such compensation continue 
for more than six years from the date of the injury 
or exceed $7800.00 in the case of no minor children, 
as herein defined, or $7800.00, plus five per cent 
for each minor child, up to a maximum of five 
such minor children or a maximum payment of 
$9,750.00." 
"Sec. 42-1-62. For partial Disability. 
Where the injury causes partial disability for 
work, the employee shall receive, during such dis-
ability and for a period of not to exceed six years 
from the date of the injury ... " 
(Chapter 55, Laws of Utah 1951) 
The Court will note that the limitation on medical, 
nursing and hospital expenses ( 42-1-75 Laws of Utah 
19 51) has always been expressed in terms of a total amount 
to be paid, with the further proviso: 
" ... provided that if upon application to and in-
vestigation by the industrial commission it shall find 
that in particular cases such an amount is insuffi-
cient, it shall determine and fix such a reasonable 
amount as under all the circumstances may be fair 
and just ... " 
Although the Company had already paid in excess of the 
statutory amount of medical expenses (Tr. 24) for Mr. 
Nielsen it voluntarily paid all medical expenses incurred in 
the removal of Mr. Nielsen's kneecap. However, the com-
pany denied liability for total temporary and permanent 
partial disability. (Tr. 29) The language of the Supreme 
Court in Harding v. Industrial Commission, 83 Utah 376, 
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28 P2d 182, is relied upon as protecting the company in 
this position: 
"It would be unjust to both the employee and the 
insurance carrier if the law were that when the 
insurance carrier once undertakes to provide medi-
cal or other care for an injured workman, it has lost 
all right to afterwards defend against what it be-
lieves to be an unjust or illegal claim." 
The history of the statutes and our Utah cases con-
struing them commence in 1917, when the Workmen's 
Compensation Laws were first enacted. The section per-
taining to total temporary disability provided: 
"Sec. 76. Rate and limit for temporary disabil-
ity. In case of temporary disability, the employee 
shall receive fifty-five per cent of his average 
weekly wages so long as such disability is total, not 
to exceed a maximum of twelve dollars per week, 
and not less than a minimum of seven dollars per 
week; but in no case to continue for more than six 
years from the date of injury, or to exceed four 
thousand five hundred dollars." 
"Sec. 77. Rate, time and schedule for partial 
disability. Where the injury causes partial disability 
for work, the employee shall receive, during such dis-
ability for work, the employee shall receive, during 
such disability and for a period of not to exceed six 
years beginning on the eleventh day of disability, a 
weekly compensation equal to fifty-five per cent of 
the difference between his average weekly wages 
before the accident and the weekly wages he is able 
to earn thereafter, but not more than twelve dollars 
a week .... " 
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(underscoring added) 
(Laws 1917, Chapter 100) 
By 19 3 3, the weekly payments had been increased 
from $12.00 per week to $16.00 per week and the waiting 
period had been reduced from 11 days to 4 days, but the 
two six year clauses remained the same. ( 4 2-1-61 and 
42-1-62, Rev. Statutes of Utah 1933). 
In 1936, the case of Hardy v. Industrial Commission, 
89 Utah 561, 48 P2d 15 came before the court. Mr. Hardy 
was injured in 1927. He was paid compensation for some 
period of time and was then medically discharged. After 
more than six years had elapsed he had further surgery 
and prosecuted his claim to the Industrial Commission 
which denied it. The Supreme Court held that the com-
mission had jurisdiction because Mr. Hardy had written a 
letter to the Commission within one year from the date 
of injury and the compensation carrier had assumed lia-
bility and paid benefits. The court further noted that 
the statute pertaining to permanent partial disability pro-
vided. 
"Where the injury causes partial disability for 
work, the employee shall receive during such dis-
ability and for a period of not to exceed six years 
beginning on the fourth day of disability ... " 
The court then held: 
"The limitation provided by the section relates 
to the disability period and not the calendar period 
dating from the injury." 
An important fact to note is that surely Mr. Hardy was 
totally and temporarily disabled from work by his recurring 
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osteomyelitis, but either no claim was made for it, or no 
appeal was taken to the Supreme Court concerning it, 
but in any event the opinion fails to mention it. The 
Hardy case made no attempt to construe the two statutes 
together. The statute pertaining to total temporary dis-
ability provided: 
"In no case shall such compensation continue 
for more than six years from the date of the injury 
or exceed $5,000." 
In 1939, the Utah Legislature amended 42-1-62 
(Compensation for partial disability) to read the same as 
42-1-61 (temporary total disability) by adding the under-
scored language below: 
" ... shall receive during such disability and for a 
period of not to exceed six years from the date of 
the injury, a weekly compensation ... " 
Plaintiff submits that by the 1939 amendment, the Legisla-
ture obviously intended to correct the interpretation given 
the permanent partial disability statute by the Hardy de-
cision. To add the phrase "from the date of the injury" 
was intended to mean a limitation of six calendar years in 
case of permanent partial disability payments, the same 
as total temporary payments. It could not mean anything 
different. It is orderly and customary to provide a statute 
of limitations in all types of litigation beyond which, 
certain claims and injuries cannot be prosecuted. Chapter 
12 of Title 78, expresses a limitation of eight years to six 
months for all the various forms of action to be prosecuted. 
The original act of 1917 stated in its title "Rate and limit 
for temporary disability (Sec. 76); Rate, time and schedule 
for partial disability (Sec. 77, Ch. 100, Laws of Utah 
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1917) . The interpretation given these statutes by our 
present Industrial Commission is that "The Commission 
has always interpreted said sections to mean casualty years 
and not calendar years." (Tr. 90) This interpretation 
flaunts and ignores the expression of TIME in both statutes. 
Six years from the date of injury means a limitation of 
liability within the prescribed TIME. The Hardy case 
should no longer be followed in view of the 1939 amend-
ment to the statute pertaining to permanent partial dis-
ability, and the fact that neither Mr. Hardy, nor the 
Industrial Commission, nor the Supreme Court thought 
that he was entitled to total temporary compensation. 
In 1949, the case of Utah Apex Mining Co. v. In-
dustrial Commission, 116 Utah 305, 209 P2d 571 decided 
that the Commission had jurisdiction more than six years 
after the date of the injury. In this case a Mr. Peterson 
was injured in 1931 and had a subsequent hospitalization 
for osteomyelitis in 1947. Once again, as in the Hardy case, 
the principal issue was whether or not the Commission 
had jurisdiction, the employer claiming that no claim had 
been filed within the 3 year period provided by 42-1-92 
(our present 35-1-99). The court held that the employer's 
payment of compensation and acknowledgment of liability 
precluded it from contending that there was a lack of 
jurisdiction. As to the six year limitation, the opinion of 
the court relied upon the Hardy case, but failed to note 
that Mr. Peterson was injured in 1931 and all of his rights 
should have been determined as of that date, which was 
prior to the 1939 amendment of the statute. Silver King 
Coalition Mines Co. v. Industrial Commission, 2 Utah 2d 
1, 268 P2d 689. 
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The Utah Apex Mining Co. decision should be care-
fully read to see that the court was entirely erroneous in 
relying upon the Hardy case, and at the same time making 
the statement that the statutes as to permanent partial 
disability and total temporary disability "are in substance, 
identical when we limit our consideration to the provision 
that payment of compensation shall not continue for more 
than six years from the date of the injury." (Page 311 of 
116 Utah) The Hardy case construed the statute as to 
permanent partial disability before the 19 3 9 amendment 
added ''from the date of the injury." The Utah Apex 
Mining Co. case was supposedly discussing the statute on 
total temporary disability and its effect on whether the 
Commission had lost jurisdiction. However, the Supreme 
Court may have meant to confer jurisdiction upon the 
Commission only for purposes of payment of medical, 
nursing and hospital expenses, not total temporary or per-
manent partial disability payments. This is suggested by 
the final caveat in the opinion which states: 
"The appeal having been taken only as to whether 
the Commission had power to act, we do not pass 
upon the question of the propriety of the additional 
award for compensation." 
It is time for this court to set the law straight and 
declare that the Legislative pronouncement that "In no 
case shall such compensation continue for more than six 
years from the date of the injury or exceed $7800.00 ... " 
means that there is a time limitation in addition to a mone-
tary maximum on payment of workmen's compensation 
benefits. 
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The concept of "casualty years" as expressed by the 
Commission in its present decision is entirely covered by 
the dollar maximums which are stated in the statute. The 
maximum for temporary total disability has been increased 
from $4500 in 1917 to the present sum of $18,720 in the 
case of a dependent wife and four minor children (35-1-
65). In the fourteen times that the Legislature has in-
creased the amount of weekly payment and total maxi-
mum amounts for total temporary disability, it has never 
changed the six year provision. This further demonstrates 
that the language in the statute "six years from the date 
of injury" was never intended by the Legislators to limit 
the AMOUNT to be paid but was intended to cut off 
liability at the specified time. The concept of casualty 
years gives no meaning whatsoever to the statutory lan-
guage "six years from the date of injury." In the case of 
Robinson v. Union Pacific R. Co. 70 Utah 441, 261 P. 9, 
the court in construing the statute stated: 
"It is our duty when possible to give every word, 
phrase, clause and sentence, a consistent reasonable . ,, 
meaning. 
The phrase "casualty years" is borrowed from the 1936 
Hardy decision, which was prior to the 1939 amendment 
of the statute. 
There has not yet been a Supreme Court decision 
that has upheld and authorized the payment of total tem-
porary disability and permanent partial disability beyond 
six years from the date of injury. 
Plaintiff is aware that the statute ( 42-1-72 U.C.A. 
1943. 35-1-78 U.C.A. 1953) further provides that "the 
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powers and jurisdiction of the Commission over each case 
shall be continuing .... " It is submitted that this is only 
operative within the six year period or for hospital and 
medical expenses which the Commission deems are fair and 
just although in excess of the statutory amount. It is 
submitted that the provisions of the Utah statutes were 
intended to accomplish the same result as those found in 
California. 
Wests Annotated California Codes - Labor 
Section 5410. "Nothing in this chapter shall bar 
the right of any injured employee to institute pro-
ceedings for the collection of compensation within 
five years after the date of the injury upon the 
ground that the original injury has caused new and 
further disability. The jurisdiction of the commis-
sion in such cases shall be a continuing jurisdiction 
at all times within such period .... " 
Section 4656. "Aggregate disability payments for 
a single injury causing temporary disability shall 
not extend for more than 240 compensable weeks 
within a period of 5 years from the date of the 
injury." 
Our present statute 35-1-99 provides: 
"If no claim for compensation is filed with 
the Industrial Commission within three years from 
the date of the accident or the date of the last pay-
ment of compensation, the right to compensation 
shall be wholly barred." 
This statute of limitation was upheld by this court in Jones 
v. Industrial Commission 17 U2d 28, 404 P2d 27. 
Also, the statute providing for payment of death 
benefits provides (35-1-68 U.C.A. 1953): 
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"In case injury causes death within the period 
of three years, the employer or insurance carrier 
shall pay ... " 
In Edwards v. Industrial Commission 112 Utah 472, 189 
P2d 124 this court stated that the above language was 
unambiguous and no interpretation of it was necessary. 
Subdivision (2) of 35-1-68 further provides for payments 
in case of death: 
" ... to continue for the remainder of the period 
between the date of death and not to exceed six 
years after the date of the injury ... " 
CONCLUSION 
It is submitted that considering the workmen's com-
pensation statutes as a whole, there is a definite consistent 
limitation of liability to six years after the date of injury. 
There is no authority in the statutes for the Industrial 
Commission to make an award for temporary total dis-
ability and permanent partial disability for surgical com-
plications incurred by Mr. Nielsen in 1965, when the 
accident sustained by him was in 1952. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MARR, WILKINS & CANNON 
Richard H. Nebeker 
400 Kennecott Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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